Can a country be rich in water and still run short when most of its rivers start abroad?

A national average hides a country with two different water problems

A national average can make Azerbaijan look better supplied than it really is. Long-term official records of river flow, rainfall, snowpack and temperature show why the number misleads. The country has about 35.3 cubic kilometres of natural water each year. About 20.3 cubic kilometres arrive from rivers that begin in neighboring countries. Only about 10.6 cubic kilometres come from local surface sources, with another 4.38 cubic kilometres held underground.

That split changes how we should read the per-person water figures. Total availability is about 3,253 cubic metres for each person each year. Locally available water is only about 1,051 cubic metres per person. By 2025, that local figure is projected to fall to about 972 cubic metres. The difference matters because Azerbaijan already withdraws about 11.7 cubic kilometres a year. That use exceeds its own surface-water supply before counting all other needs.

The geographic map behind those records shows a second, sharper split. Semi-arid lowlands face hot air, high evaporation and long dry spells. Mountain areas act as natural water towers, storing snow and ice that later feed rivers. Hotter temperatures and changed rainfall can disturb the timing of meltwater. They can also make river flows smaller in critical periods and harder to predict.

This is why one national average hides two different problems. In lowland regions, scarcity can tighten before demand fully arrives. In highland catchments, the risk lies less in total volume than in when water appears. The country’s average shortage is estimated at 3.7 cubic kilometres a year. In low-water years, that gap rises to about 4.75 cubic kilometres. Those figures become larger once releases for ecosystems and other uses are included.

The rivers that enter Azerbaijan often arrive already weakened by pollution and upstream choices

Much of the water that reaches Azerbaijan has already been shaped by decisions made far upstream. More than seventy percent of the country’s surface water arrives from neighboring lands, so Baku does not control the main flow it depends on. Long-term river-flow records show why this matters. Of about 35.3 cubic kilometres of natural water available each year, roughly 20.3 cubic kilometres come through transboundary rivers. Local surface water supplies only about 10.6 cubic kilometres.

That dependence makes the national average look more comfortable than it is. Total availability is about 3,253 cubic metres per person per year, but locally available water is closer to 1,051 cubic metres per person. That local figure is projected to fall to about 972 by 2025. The problem goes beyond the amount of water that arrives. The Kura and Araz rivers are already degraded in quality, and upstream inflows often carry pollution before they reach Azerbaijani territory.

Industrial discharge, agricultural runoff and untreated wastewater can reduce usable volume, raise treatment costs and create health risks for people downstream. When a river enters already weakened by such loads, the receiving side must spend more to make it safe. The source of the damage may lie outside its legal reach. Upstream choices can also change the volume that arrives, because neighboring countries may use shared waters for their own needs.

Azerbaijan says it follows the Helsinki Convention for basin-wide planning, but practical work with Georgia and Iran on the Kura and Araz basins is hindered by political barriers. Without regional cooperation, the country remains exposed to upstream pollution, river diversion and one-sided use of shared waters. Joint management could improve water quality, reduce drought and flood impacts, support ecosystems and lower the pollution reaching the Caspian Sea.

Farms use most of the fresh water, but aging pipes and fragmented rules waste more than they save

Farms take the largest share of Azerbaijan’s fresh water, and much of it leaks away before crops use it. Long-term river records and policy documents show irrigation uses more than seventy percent of fresh water. In one accounting of withdrawals, farms receive sixty to seventy percent. Industry takes twenty to twenty-five percent, while homes and drinking systems take the rest. Azerbaijan withdraws about eleven point seven cubic kilometres of water each year. That is more than its local surface-water supply, which is only ten point six cubic kilometres. The gap shows why old pipes and leaky canals matter so much. Many reservoirs, dams and irrigation channels are in poor technical condition. Poor condition makes storage harder, distribution less reliable, and drought or flood response weaker. Fragmented rules add another loss because multiple agencies manage different parts with weak coordination. Enforcement is limited, so losses can persist even when a repair plan exists. The new water strategy approved in October 2024 runs to 2040 and starts with modernization. Its first phase, from 2024 to 2027, targets infrastructure upgrades and basin management in two regions. Later phases aim at governance, hydro-ecological problems, new technologies and cleaner water access. Planned steps include rehabilitating irrigation systems, harvesting rainwater, recycling greywater and building real-time monitoring. Those measures matter because farms already use most of the water that can be saved or lost. Efficiency gains in fields could shrink the national shortage, which averages three point seven cubic kilometres a year. In low-water years, that shortage rises to 4.75 cubic kilometres. Once mandatory releases for ecosystems and energy are counted, the gap becomes larger. The fix needs less waste in pipes, fields and rules.

Water security will be won or lost beyond Azerbaijan’s borders

A review of official river, rainfall, snowpack and temperature records, together with policy documents, shows that Azerbaijan’s water problem is a governance challenge as much as a climate one. The country receives more than seven tenths of its surface water from neighboring states, so it cannot control the volume or quality arriving in its main rivers. Climate change adds pressure by altering snowmelt, rainfall and evaporation, while population growth raises demand. Locally available water is already projected to fall from about 1,051 cubic metres per person a year to about 972 by 2025. If groundwater pumping continues unchecked, withdrawals may exceed confirmed reserves by 2050.

The opportunity is that Azerbaijan now has a strategy running to 2040, with phases for modernizing infrastructure, improving basin management and expanding monitoring. It also points to irrigation upgrades, rainwater harvesting, greywater recycling, desalination and real-time tracking as tools that can reduce waste. The obstacle is that these plans depend on institutions that are still fragmented, underfunded in enforcement and weak at coordinating sectors. Political barriers with Georgia and Iran make joint management of the Kura and Araz basins difficult, even though cooperation could improve water quality and reduce flood and drought damage. For other river-dependent states, the lesson is that water security cannot be solved inside national borders alone.

Newly liberated territories are included in the need for planning, but they lack separate figures and detailed assessment. Azerbaijan’s water future will therefore depend on whether technical fixes can be matched by legal clarity, shared data and trust between states. Can a country secure water when most of it arrives from outside?